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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES
SOUTH AFRICA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
By Greg Moran*
The apartheid policies that characterised most of the period of
colonial rule, both formally (after 1948) and informally before, left an
indelible mark on the consciousness of South Africans, (and on the
map of the country prior to 1994). The policy of creating separate
homelands for each of the black ethnic groupings and pushing these to
independence to ensure the survival of white South Africa, lead to the
creation of numerous police and armed forces. The records of all of
these are severely blemished and their histories steeped in blood.
At present, moves are afoot to incorporate all of these security
forces into unified bodies: the South African National Defense Force
(SANDF) and the South African Police Services (SAPS). This process
is slow and not without difficulty, but there is a sense that at last these
forces will be used to protect citizens, rather than wage war on them.
I. EARLY HISTORY 1652-1910
The first white settlers arrived in South Africa in 1652, when Jan
Van Riebeck arrived at the Cape. Van Riebeck set up the first
settlement as part of the Dutch East India Company. The Cape
remained under Dutch control until it was annexed by Britain in
September 1795. The British returned the colony to the Batavian
Republic in 1803, but re-occupied it in 1806. The colony was formally
ceded to Britain after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815.
Apart from the latter part of the 19th Century, when the Boer
Republics of Orange-Vrysaat (subsequently the Orange Free State) and
the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (subsequently the Transvaal) were
independent of British rule, the defences of internal policing policies
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of South Africa were determined by the British, who retained control
of South Africa until independence was granted in 1961.
Early police and armed forces in South Africa were usually
expected to perform both police and defence roles. Dutch settlers in
1652 were immediately faced with problems of theft and attacks on
their settlement by indigenous people. The original settlement was
defended by a small detachment of mercenaries from Holland. The
outlying farmers formed small bands to protect their property.
In 1657, a Fiscal was appointed to oversee defence of the infant
colony. He was succeeded by a "Ratelwag" (estimated: 3 July 1686
and consisting of ten settlers under the command of a Sergeant and a
Corporal). The role of the Ratelwag was to prevent, rather than
investigate crime; it continued in this form until 1792. It was during
this period that the first police station opened in South Africa. The
Ratelwag then became the Dienaars, to serve during daylight hours,
and a night watch known as the Nagwag.
The Nagwag and Dienaars were retained by the British when they
annexed the Cape in 1795. Police personnel at the time were all male
and were drawn from the ranks of discharged sailors and soldiers. On
1 November 1835, the Nagwag and Dienaars were replaced by the
Cape Constabulary. At the same time, a number of semi-military
police forces had been established in the outlying areas of Cape Town.
All existing police units in the Cape were re-organised into one force
in 1885: the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP). The FAMP
was intended to perform police duties, but the succession of frontier
wars against local inhabitants meant that this force was often involved
in warfare rather than police duties.
Dutch settlers, unhappy with British rule, had been fleeing the
Cape for some time. In the 1850s, they set up two Boer Republics.
(The term "Boer" literally translates as farmer. This term has become
synonymous with the Dutch settler, most of whom were farmers). The
two Republics became known as the Orange Free State and Transvaal.
They re-introduced the system of Commandos to act both as a military
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and police force. In 1862, the Orange Free State created the Orange-
Vrystaat Republikensche Politie (OVRP).
In 1877, Britain re-annexed the Transvaal, but was eventually
driven out by the Boers, who formed the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek
Politie (ZARP) in 1881. In 1878, the FAMP was disbanded and
replaced by the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR). The Cape Police were
replaced by the CMR in 1882. In the British colony of Natal, the Natal
Mounted Police came into being in 1884.
The British continued seizing land around the borders of the Boer
Republieks, which culminated in the Boer war of 1899. The British
finally overcame the Boers in 1902, and talks of unifying the Cape-the
two previous republieks and the Natal-colony began. In 1910, this
culminated in the creation of the Union of South Africa. Although the
Union Government had wide powers, South Africa remained a British
colony until 1961.
The Cape Police were replaced by the Mounted Police in 1882.
The ZARP and OVRP were disbanded and replaced by the Transvaal
Police and the Orange River Colony Police, after the Anglo-Boer war.
II. FROM UNION TO INDEPENDENCE 1910-1961
The end of the Anglo-Boer War brought forth questions of
unification for the colonies. The Union of South Africa was created
by an agreement reached in 1910.
Under the unification agreement of 1910 a variety of provincial,
municipal and rural police forces were set up. Government began
looking at ways to unify the various forces and in 1912, the Police Act
was passed. It came into operation on 1 April 1913. Two forces were
initially established; the South African Police (SAP) and the South
African Mounted Riflemen, which was in effect a purely military
force.
The new unification Government also had to deal with the Boer
Commandos. In 1912, the Defence Act was passed to integrate these
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Commandos and regular volunteer British units into one force. From
1912 onwards, it was anticipated that the army and the Police would
perform very different services. However, the blurring of roles that
characterised early colonial police and armed forces would continue
throughout the ensuing period, culminating in the use of the army to
quell internal unrest and perform a wide variety of police functions in
the turmoil following the Soweto uprising of 1976.
With the Defence Act 13 of 1912, defence of the Union was the
responsibility of all citizens. The Defence Act required military
service of every European between the ages of seventeen and twenty.
Service could be performed either inside South Africa, or outside the
Union.
In addition, every citizen was subject to undergo military training
in the Active Citizen Force or the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.
This requirement covered a period of four years between the ages of
seventeen and twenty-five. A certain percentage was called up for this
each year, while the remainder were expected to join various Rifle
Associations for the same period. Although people not of European
descent were not subject to the same obligations, they were entitled to
volunteer for service.
The Permanent Force was established in 1913. In reality it was a
military constabulary tasked with performing police work. It consisted
of five regiments and a battery of artillery for each regiment. Each
was made up of 103 officers; 348 Non-Commissioned Officers; 1,565
riflemen; and 2,000 black and Indian constables.
The Active Citizen Force and Cadet Organisation were also
established in 1913. By 31 December 1913, the Active Citizen Force
and Coast Garrison had a combined force of 23,462 men, while the
Cadet Organisation was 11,318 strong. Moves were taken to set up
Rifle Associations and 42,000 members joined within a year. Many of
these were volunteers and they were armed with a rifle, a bandoleer
and free ammunition.
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The first test for the fledgling army came in January 1914, when it
was used to quell an uprising amongst coal miners. In August of that
year, the First World War was declared. The British Government
requested the Union Government to seize control of German South
West Africa, which led to three prominent UDF (and former Boer)
commanders rebelling, together with several thousand supporters.
Within weeks, the UDF had mobilised 30,000 troops to overcome this
rebellion, which collapsed in December 1914. By 9 July 1915, the
German army in South West Africa had capitulated, and South Africa
had taken control of the area, control that it would not relinquish for
nearly three quarters of a century.
UDF were then sent for active duty elsewhere, including East
Africa, France, and Egypt. By the end of the war, a total of 254,666
South Africans had served in the UDF.
In 1920, the South African Air Force was officially formed with
100 aeroplanes, and in 1922, the South African Naval Services came
into being with three ships, thirteen officers and 110 other ranks.
In February 1922, white mineworkers on the Rand began a strike
that rapidly escalated into an attempt to topple the government. They
formed themselves into Commandos and clashed with police. By
March, the police were unable to cope and the UDF was called in to
assist. Martial law was declared in several magisterial districts. It was
enforced until the collapse of the strike on 17 March 1922.
From 1922 onwards, the UDF diminished radically in size and by
1927, the size of the Permanent Force had dwindled to 151 officers
and 1,259 other ranks. The Great Depression during the 1930s saw
further reductions in the number of personnel. A new period of
growth began in 1934 with the creation of the Special Service
Battalion, which was set up to provide employment for those affected
by the depression. This growth continued until the Second World
War. By September 1939, the Permanent Force consisted of 352
officers and 5,033 other ranks, while the Citizen Force consisted of
918 officers and 12,572 other ranks.
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A total of 334,324 volunteers served the UDF during the Second
World War: 211,193 whites; 45,892 "Coloureds" and Indians; and
77,239 blacks. South African soldiers saw service in East and North
Africa, Madagascar and Italy. On 1 February 1943, South Africa's
first armoured division was created. Although very little modem
equipment was available at the outbreak of the war, with the
development of an arms industry, South Africa was able to produce
nearly 6,000 armoured cars, light tanks, about 600 guns and
ammunition of all types.
Demobilisation of these forces began almost immediately after the
war ended in 1945. Two divisions remained in force, but the number
of volunteers diminished so rapidly that many brigades were
disbanded.
Another consequence of the lack of volunteers was the
introduction of a ballot conscription system in 1953. Conscripts were
required to spend three months in training during the first year and
twenty-one days each year for a further three years. In 1956, the UDF
was re-organised into thirty-two Afrikaans Defence Forces (SADF).
The South African Police (SAP) was created by the Police Act of
1912. The act was designed to cover all existing police forces in the
Union. The only exceptions to this were the cities of Durban and
Pietermaritzburg, which elected to retain their municipal forces.
Initially, the force was split into the South African Police and the
paramilitary South African Mounted Rifleman, which was disbanded
and its members incorporated into the SAP in 1920. From then on,
there would be only one national police force in South Africa,
although each "homeland" would create its own force, to act within its
territories.
The initial strength of the police when they began operating in
1913 was 5,938. Of these, all but 1,470 were white, and all 101
officers in this group were also white. The highest rank a non-white
member of the force could hope to achieve was the rank of sergeant.
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The first test for the SAP came at the end of 1913, when they were
used to quell a miners' strike in January 1914. At the end of the strike,
twenty-two miners were dead, and eighty-eight hospitalised with
gunshot wounds.
The SAP became the force that would suppress strikes and
demonstrations by disenfranchised blacks in the early years. This
pattern continued throughout the period under review. Fears of the
communist threat, which was believed to come from the north, lead to
the creation of the notorious Security Branch in 1947. This arm of the
police became a secret force that was used against any political
opponents of Apartheid. It had the worst human rights record. Its
members would torture or kill those unlucky enough to fall into their
hands. The entire branch was shrouded in secrecy; its members were
rarely exposed and never prosecuted for their reign of terror.
The Police Act allowed the police to be used in military roles,
which further blurred the distinction between the security forces. The
Police were used in combat during both the First and Second World
Wars.
The racial bias continued throughout this period, and it was only in
the 1950s that the numbers of black police personnel were radically
increased. Not surprisingly, this was the result of apartheid policies
that created black homelands in rural areas and black townships near
urban areas. The upper echelons of the SAP were against using white
policemen to patrol these areas, and so a drive was started to recruit
black members for this duty. They were paid less than their white
counterparts, had fewer opportunities for promotion, were less well
armed and worked in appalling police stations. In addition, they were
seen as sell-outs and, from 1976 onwards, were increasingly the target
for violence in their areas.
III. TROUBLE AND STRIFE 1985
The National Party came to power in 1948 and began
implementing its policy of Apartheid with great zeal. In 1961, South
Africa gained independence from Britain and became the Republic of
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South Africa. During the 1960s, newly independent African states
began calling for and implementing an arms embargo against the
Apartheid regime. News broke in 1967 that the police were fighting
alongside the Rhodesian police and army against liberation movements
in Zimbabwe, that SAP members were being used to patrol the border
between Angola and Namibia, that they were often involved in border
skirmishes with the members of the South West African People's
Organisation (SWAPO), and that the government, fearing invasion and
terrified of the perceived communist threat North of its border, decided
to radically increase the size of the SADF. The ballot system of
conscription was unable to keep up with the growth. On 1 January
1968, a new national service was introduced for white males (although
other races were still able to volunteer for service). With the new
system, conscripts were required to serve a period of one-year
continuous service followed by ten years in the Citizen Force.
In 1968 a state company, ARMSCOR, was created to cater to
South Africa's military equipment needs.
Members of the liberation armies of the banned African National
Congress (ANC) and its affiliates and SWAPO began infiltrating
South Africa and South West Africa respectively during the early
1970s. In 1973, the SADF took over the responsibility of defence of
South West Africa from the police. Conscripts were encouraged to
sign on for an additional year of voluntary service in 1974, and in 1975
the SADF intervened in the Angolan civil war on the side of UN1TA.
A contingent numbering "no more than 2,000" (according to official
figures) was sent to assist UNITA in its war against the communist-
backed MPLA.
The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution in
November 1977 that formalised and extended the arms embargo
against South Africa. South Africa retaliated by pumping massive
government funding into ARMSCOR, which lead to the development
of numerous infantry fighting vehicles: air to air missiles, helicopters,
surface to surface missiles, heavy tanks, and the upgrading of existing
Mirage fighter aircraft to Cheetahs. In 1978, the period of national
service was increased to two years. In 1983 the requirement for
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service in the Citizen Force, after completion of national service, was
increased to 720 days over a period of twelve years, plus an additional
twelve days per year until the age of fifty-five.
On 4 May 1978, South Africa launched its first official operation
against SWAPO bases in Angola. These attacks continued until South
Africa's withdrawal from South West Africa/Namibia, and included
attacks against the Angolan army such as Operation Protea in 1981,
which at the time was the largest mechanised operation of South
African forces since the Second World War.
Between 1981 and 1986, South Africa's foreign policy towards
neighbouring states was one of destabilisation. The SADF struck at
ANC bases and strategic sites in Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho,
Zambia and Zimbabwe, and continued to assist anti-government forces
in Angola. The South African government also began actively
assisting Super Zapu forces in Zimbabwe and Renamo forces in their
war against the Frelimo government of Mozambique. They supplied
arms, ammunition, training, communication systems and intelligence
gathering. The October 1986 air crash that killed then Mozambican
President Samora Machel was widely believed to have been caused by
South African security forces.
. By the mid 1980s, political unrest in South Africa had grown to
enormous proportions and the government introduced the ADF into
the townships for the first time to cope with battles that raged
throughout South Africa. The Security forces also became embroiled
in politics during the states of emergency. This occurred during the
late 1980s, at both the national and local levels. The role of the
security forces during this period will be examined in the section on
states of emergency below.
IV. BRiEF HISTORY OF UMKMONTO WE SIZWE (MK)
The ANC launched its armed wing, MK, on 16 December 1961.
At present, it is second only to the SADF in terms of numbers, and it is
necessary to look briefly at its history.
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Shortly after its inception, the leaders of MK, including Nelson
Mandela and Walter Sisulu, were arrested. They were tried and jailed
for life. Those who escaped set about establishing the ANC and MK
externally, with subsequent bases in Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, Angola, England and, much later, Tanzania, Uganda,
India and Ghana.
It was from this basis that MK co-ordinated attacks on South
African targets and recruited members from within South Africa. MK
was conceived as, and remained a political army, engaged with the
ANC in the revolutionary struggle against the apartheid regime. Its
leadership was linked with the leadership of the ANC. Training and
weapons were provided by Eastern block countries, Cuba and Algeria.
Although initial targets included electrical supply stations and
attacks on military and police personnel or buildings, the later strategy,
implemented for creating a "people's war" included bomb attacks on
civilians. MK's official strength of trained soldiers stood at 12,000,
the people's war eventually lead to the development of Self Defence
Units (SDUs) within the borders of South Africa. These were
perceived as parts of the revolutionary army and were tasked with
attacking security force patrols within the townships. Some members
were trained outside South Africa and then return to train fellow SDU
members within the borders. During the 1990s, the ANC lost political
control over the SDUs, which had grown in numbers substantially, and
they now pose a problem to the new government. There are presently
moves to demobilise the SDUs and return younger members to school,
while incorporating the rest into South African National Defence
Force (SANDF) and South African Police Services (SAPS).
V. STATES OF EMERGENCY AND THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY
FORCES 1985-1990
Opposition by the then legal ANC and recently formed Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC) during the late 1959 and early 1960 led to
public demonstrations against the pass law system that required all
blacks to carry identity documents proving their right to remain in
urban areas at all times. One such demonstration in Sharpeville (a
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township near Johannesburg) on 21 March 1960, resulted in police
opening fire on the crowd. Official figures state that sixty-nine people
were killed and 180 injured, although eyewitness accounts suggest the
numbers were much higher. News of the massacre spread rapidly
causing further confrontations, and the government responded by
banning public meetings in all trouble spots. On 28 March 1960, the
government introduced legislation banning the ANC and PAC and
began arresting members of these organisations under the first
emergency regulations passed in South Africa and which would last
for the next three months. The state of emergency extended to 122 of
the Union's 265 magisterial districts; it empowered the government to
prohibit gatherings, impose curfews, detain people without trial,
impound publications, search premises and do whatever was necessary
to maintain public order. During this period, police detained an
estimated 18,000 people. Most were released after screening, but over
5,000 were convicted and sentenced for various offences. Many were
held for lengthy periods without trial. Included amongst those
convicted were the leaders of the PAC and ANC.
In 1963, although no state of emergency was declared, legislation
was passed enabling the police to detain people without trial for the
purposes of interrogation. This legislation continued until it was
incorporated into one piece of legislation, the Internal Security Act of
1982. Although figures are not readily available for this period, David
Webster estimates approximately 16,000 people were detained
between 1963 and 1985.
The second state of emergency began on 20 July 1985 and was
limited to certain areas. A short break in the emergency took place
between 7 March and 20 June 1986, when the first of a series of
annual emergencies came into place of the entire country. This annual
emergency was re-imposed on 11 June 1987; 10 June 1988; and 9 June
1989. On 8 June 1990, the government decided to re-impose the
emergency in selected areas only. This reduced emergency remained
in place until 18 October 1990.
Regulations were passed during this period banning political
meetings, severely restricting the press from reporting on political
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activities or violence, empowering police and security forces to arrest
and detain people without trial, and banning political organisations and
their members.
By 1988, state power and executive decision-making authority had
become concentrated in the Office of the State President, which itself
had become largely dependent on the National Security Management
System (NSMS). South Africa had become a virtual police state with
growing levels of unrest and violence in the country. Through the
inclusion of the Ministers of Law and Order (Police) and Defence in
the structures of the NSMS, particularly the State Security Council
(SSC), which was at the head of the NSMS, the security forces came
to play an increasingly powerful part in the governance of the country.
A network of over 500 Joint Management Committees (JMCs) was
also created, under the control of the National Joint Management
Committee (NJMC), which itself fell under the control of the SSC.
These JMCs were situated in almost every settled community within
the country, and were designed to manage security force involvement
at the local level. They invariably consisted of two major committees
to provide a carrot and stick approach to security: the first, the security
committees, were staffed by security police, riot police, and military
officers and were to co-ordinate the implementation of security
strategies laid down by the SSC. The second committee, the welfare
committee, was designed to win the hearts and minds of the population
away from the liberation movements and saw to the implementation of
development programmes within communities.
The SADF and SAP began creating and assisting groups of
vigilantes to fight against anti-government forces in the townships, in
addition to political policing and army involvement at both the
national and local levels.
These vigilantes were often linked to the predominantly black
municipal police forces operating in the townships that were set up to
serve the needs of the unpopular black local authorities. They attacked
liberation movement members or supporters either with police backing
or in full view of security forces that refused to intervene. Political
assassinations, intimidation and kidnapping of prominent liberation
BACKGROUND OF ISFs IN SOUTH AFRICA
movement members in and outside South Africa also began, most of
which appear to have been performed by death squads made up of
members of the security police establishment. These included the
Paris assassination of ANC civilian emissary to Europe, Dulcie
September; David Webster (an academic whose work, ironically
including an investigation into assassinations, has been used during the
compilation of this report); and the attempted assassination of
prominent ANC academic Albie Sachs who was seriously injured in a
car bomb attack in Mozambique.
Tens of thousands of activists were detained during this period,
either under the state of emergency regulations, or under the Internal
Security Act, both of which provided for detention without trial for an
indefinite period. From 1985 to 1986, 8,000 people were detained,
while from 1986 to 1987, 25,000 were detained. Many of these people
spent more than two years in detention. Those who were released
were served with restriction orders by the police immediately after
their release. The power given to the police with emergency
regulations to "restrict" people amounted in reality to the ability to ban
people from belonging to certain organisations, preclude them from
attending or addressing meetings, and, in many instances, deny them
employment. Although the number of people detained after 1987
decreased, this owed more to the security establishment finding more
effective ways of dealing with activists (such as long periods of
detention for key figures in organisations rather than mass detentions,
banning of organisations and their members, assassinations and
kidnapping) rather than a realisation of the error of their ways.
The states of emergency that dominated the late 1980s did not
immediately effect the use of the SADF in destabilisation of
neighbouring states. The war in Angola continued, as did the funding
and support of rebel forces in Mozambique and SADF raids into
Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Swaziland.
By 1988 though, a turning point was reached in the regional
struggle. The war in Angola was costing the South African
government R4-billion per year, a sum that could no longer be justified
in the sanctions-fuelled recession that was gripping the country. In
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addition, the SADF suffered its biggest military defeat in Angola at the
hands of the Cuban trained and equipped Angolan army. It was clear
that South Africa had lost control over southern Angola and that future
defeats with attendant massive loss of life were inevitable.
By late 1988, the South African government had signed an accord
agreeing to withdraw from Angola and to begin withdrawing from
Namibia in anticipation of Namibia's independence. Internal and
international pressure on South Africa, including condemnation of
Renamo brutality and sanctions against South Africa, had begun to
tell, and it became clearer that drastic steps would be necessary to
prevent full-scale civil war. These drastic steps were realised in early
1990, when political organisations such as the ANC and its affiliates
were "unbanned", their leaders released from prison and a period of
negotiations was embarked on to clear the way for the first democratic
elections in 1994.
From 1990 onwards, President De Klerk took steps to reign in the
SAP and SADF. He wrestled decision-making control away from the
security establishment and appeared committed to negotiations with
previous enemies of the state. Nevertheless, the period leading up to
the 1994 election was not without difficulty. Continuing violence in
the townships led to the imposition of "mini states of emergency"
imposed under the Internal Security Act and Public Safety Act. These
acts conferred wide-ranging powers on the security forces to arrest and
detain people and to search premises without warrants. Although the
SAP and SADF were more restrained during this period, there were
shocking incidents of violence. For example, in March 1990, SAP
members fired at demonstrators in Sebokeng township, killing
eighteen and injuring over 200.
A scandal involving the payment of R250,000 to Inkatha (a
conservative black political party) to organise anti-ANC rallies led
ultimately to the dismissal of the Ministers of Law and Order (police)
and Defence. The SAP was also frequently criticised for failing to
curb, and even actively supporting vigilante groups within the
townships. There were also allegations that a "third force," consisting
of conservative members of the security forces, was operating to
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disrupt the negotiation process and that security forces were involved
with hit squads operating against ANC. Evidence presented to the
Goldstone Commission of Inquiry, appointed to investigate allegations
of security force misconduct, provided some support for these
allegations, and allegations that SAP and SADF personnel were
providing training and assistance to Inkatha and other conservative
black groups.
The situation calmed down somewhat in 1993-1994, when some
control over the security forces was given to the Transitional
Executive Council that was appointed to clear the way for the election.
Nevertheless, violence in KwaZulu/Natal in the months preceding the
election necessitated a further state of emergency in that province
alone. This was declared on 31 March 1994 and lapsed on 7
September 1994.
Besides states of emergency, both the National Party Government
and the present Government of National Unity (GNU) have resorted to
legislation that allows for areas to be declared "unrest areas." Once an
area has been so designated, the police are given wider powers than
usual (such as the power to search without a warrant) in an attempt to
quell the unrest. Areas are periodically declared unrest areas for short
periods, whenever the security forces are unable to cope with unrest,
which still continues despite the election.
VI. COUPS AND STATES OF EMERGENCY IN THE TVBC STATES
In keeping with South Africa's apartheid policy, ten homelands
were created in which blacks were expected to live. Four of these
(Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei, known collectively as
the TVBC states) were granted "independence" from South Africa and
were allowed to create their own armies. The remaining "self
governing" areas were entitled to create their own police forces, which
acted more as paramilitary forces.
Interestingly, all four of the TVBC states, with their puppet leaders
appointed by South African government and not by democratic
election, had experience with coups and attempted coups. Many of
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these were put down with assistance from the SADF, although South
Africa steadfastly maintained these areas were independent. The
history of conflict in these areas is examined briefly below.
Transkei was granted "independence" on 26 October 1976. As
with all of the TVBC states, South Africa was the only country in the
world to recognise their independence.
In September 1987 after allegations of government corruption,
South Africa convened a commission of inquiry to perform an
investigation. Shortly afterwards, reports of a coup in Transkei were
hotly denied by both the Transkei and South African governments,
despite evidence that force had been used to obtain the resignation of
six members of the cabinet.
On 30 December 1987, Major General Bantu Holomisa lead a
bloodless coup against the government. Martial law was declared for
one day, restrictions were placed on political activity and the
constitution was suspended. A council of ministers and a military
council headed by Holomisa were set up to govern the country.
In January 1988, Holomisa accused the South African government
of trying to assassinate him. Fourteen people were arrested. In
November 1990, twelve people were killed trying to overthrow the
government. Holomisa accused South Africa of complicity in the
failed coup attempt, which the South African government obviously
denied. By January 1991, a further thirty-two people had been
arrested for their roles in the attempted coup, including the first
President of Transkei, Chief Kaiser Matanzima. It was also apparent
that Holomisa had forged strong ties with the recently unbanned ANC
and PAC.
In August 1992, the Transkei Defence Force detained several army
officers and ministers, although Holomisa was adamant that this was
not another attempt to overthrow the government, but only the result of
a protest about low wages. South Africa accused Holomisa of
harbouring PAC members who had launched attacks against whites in
South Africa, and relationships between the two governments
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deteriorated to such an extent that SADF troops were deployed along
the border.
As with all TVBC states and homelands, the Transkei was
incorporated into South Africa on 27 April 1994, the date of the first
democratic election and the date on which the new Interim
Constitution came into effect.
Venda was granted independence on 13 September 1979. Its
history is fairly tame, but a military coup in April 1990 lead to
President Ravele and his cabinet being overthrown by Colonel Gabriel
Ramushwana, deputy chief of the Venda Defence Force
Bophuthatswana was granted independence on 6 December 1977
under the leadership of President Mangope. In February 1988, South
African troops were called in by the government to help put down a
coup attempt by dissident members of the Bophuthatswana Defence
Force. Five people were killed and 190 detained. Of the 190 detained,
125 were found guilty of high treason and seventeen guilty of
terrorism.
After the ANC was unbanned in 1990, it gained great support in
Bophuthatswana, much to the chagrin of Magope, who was adamant
that Bophuthatswana should retain a large degree of autonomy after
the election. In early March 1990, a demonstration in favour of re-
incorporation into South Africa was met with army and police
intervention. Several demonstrators were killed, culminating in a state
of emergency being declared until March 1991. In November 1990,
forty ANC members were arrested and accused of plotting to
overthrow the government.
In one of the most bizarre incidents leading up to the election, anti-
Mangope demonstrations in early 1994 became increasingly violent.
The President retreated to his official residence; members of the arch
conservative, all white, Afrikaner Weerstands Beweeguered (AWB)
crossed into Bophuthatswana to assist the beleaguered autocrat. They
were met by members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, many of
who were ANC supporters, and were convincingly repulsed.
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The Ciskei, bordering on the Transkei and similarly composed of
mostly Xhosa speaking people, was granted independence on 4
December 1991, the last of the homelands to accept this.
In July 1983, President Lennox Sebe thwarted a rumoured coup by
accusing his brothers Charles Sebe (head of the Central Intelligence
Service and Security) and Namba Sebe (Minister of Transport) of
trying to overthrow him. Namba fled to neighbouring Transkei, but
Charles was arrested and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment.
In October 1989, protest marches took place in the small rural area
of Nkqokqweni, whose residents were unhappy that the area had
recently been ceded to Ciskei by the South African government. One
hundred were arrested and 800 forcibly evicted from their homes.
Needless to say, President Sebe's popularity was waning fast.
In March 1990, whilst President Sebe was abroad, the government
was overthrown in a military coup by General Joshua "Oupa" Gqozo.
The office of the President was abolished and the national assembly
dissolved and replaced by a military council. The coup was followed
by widespread violence, since Gqozo was no more popular than Sebe
and was violently anti-ANC. A state of emergency was declared and,
at Gqozo's request, South African troops were sent to Ciskei to quell
the unrest.
On 27 January 1991, General Charles Sebe, freed from prison by
Gqozo, and a former member of the military council were killed by
government forces while trying to seize power from Gqozo. In early
February of that year, a new constitution came into place that included
plans for re-incorporation into South Africa. Shortly afterwards, a
further attempt to overthrow Gqozo was put down with assistance
from SADF troops.
A state of emergency was imposed in Ciskei, in late October 1991,
over a dispute with the ANC. It lasted until November 1991, during
this time several hundred ANC supporters were arrested.
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During 1992, Gqozo changed tack and began calling for Ciskei to
have a high degree of autonomy, if not independence, after the.
election. Economically destitute and unviable as Ciskei is, this attitude
was not universally shared by its citizens. In August 1992, 30,000
ANC supporters, demanding immediate re-incorporation into South
Africa and Gqozo's resignation, were denied entrance to Ciskei. They
began marching on the capital, Bisho, about 30 kilometers from the
border, and were fired on by the Ciskei Defence Force, leaving
twenty-eight dead and 200 injured.
VII. PRESENT COMPOSITION OF DEFENCE FORCES IN SA
The defence force in South Africa is undergoing a massive change
as "independent" defence forces and old enemies are incorporated into
the new SANDF. By 1994, the old SADF consisted of a standing
force of approximately 40,000; approximately 25,000 white male
conscripts; 27,000 civilians; and reserves totalling almost 440,000.
For fairly obvious reasons, the SADF was characterised by its
racial bias in favour of whites. The number of coloureds, Indians and
blacks did increase steadily from the early years of this century.
Repugnant as these racial classifications are, it is impossible to
describe racial issues in South Africa without reference to them, since
people were officially classified in terms of these definitions. By
1986, the SADF was 76% white; 12% black; 11% coloured; 1%
Indian. The SADF was also structured in such a way that members of
different race groups were never included in the same battalions.
From 1994, the SADF began changing from a system that relied
primarily on white male conscription to a new system based primarily
on volunteers. The period of national service, which provided
approximately 25,000 servicemen a year, was reduced in the late
1980s from two to one year's service and compulsory national Service
has now been phased out. The defence budget has also been reduced
from 4.3 percent of the gross domestic product from 1983 to 1984, to
2.6 percent in 1993 to 1984.
Black representation in the TVBC states' armies was
understandably much higher than in the SADF, although leadership
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usually was vested in officers seconded to them from the SADF.
Estimated strengths of these armies are:
Bophuthatswana Defence Force: 3,500 and 5.300 reserves;
Ciskei Defence Force: 2,000 and 2,000 reserves;
Transkei Defence Force: 3,500 and 3,300 reserves; and
Venda Defence Force: 1,800 and 2,000 reserves;
The TVBC states were created along ethnic lines and, not surprisingly,
their respective armies show corresponding ethnic homogeny.
Along with the legitimate armies within South African borders, a
number of additional armies came into existence during the struggle
for democracy. These were the ANC's MK; the PAC's Azanian
People's Liberation Army (APLA); and the Azanian People's
Organisation Azanian Liberation Army (AZANLA).
With the unbanning of these political organisations in 1990,
members of these armies returned to South Africa to await
incorporation into the new defence force. Their estimated respective
strengths in 1994 were:
MK: 12 000 (excluding SDU members);
APLA: 200; and
AZAPO: 200.
These are all to be incorporated into the new SANDF.
Much debate as to the future of the security forces is taking place,
particularly around the incorporation into the national police and
defence forces of police and defence forces of previous "independent"
states and homelands and armed wings of the various liberation
movements. There is also some debate as to the impact of the Interim
Constitution on the defence forces. An example of this is the
argument of Commodore Dunstan Smart, who argues that the death
penalty and corporal punishment should be retained for members of
the security forces (in apparent contradiction with the Constitution);
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and that the protective rules relating to detained, arrested and accused
persons contained in the Constitution should not be extended to
military trials.
VIII. PRESENT COMPOSITION OF POLICE FORCES IN SA
As with the defence forces, apartheid policies led to the
establishment of eleven police forces in South Africa, each with its
own empowering legislation, commissioners, uniforms and standards.
These were the South African Police (SAP) and police forces in each
of the TVBC states and self-governing territories.
At present, these forces are all in the process of formal
incorporation into the new South African Police Services (SAPS),
although informal incorporation has already taken place.
The SAPS consists of 141,388 members' made up as follows:
Permanent Staff (all ranks):
Non-Head Office Staff: 103,426
Head-Office Staff: 7,575
Civilian Members (all ranks):
Non-Head Office Staff: 25,312
Head-Office Staff: 5,075
Of these forces, approximately 115,000 are drawn from the old SAP.
The racial makeup is 54% black; 35% white; 8% coloured; and 3%
Indian. Males make up 82% of all forces.
Formal integration is continuing and as of this writing it is
expected that the National and Deputy National Commissioners will
be appointed in early March 1995. The appointment of Provincial
Commissioners for each of the nine provinces is expected to take place
before the end of March 1995, and the new Police Act, which will
Figures supplied by Peter Gastrow, chairman of the Interim Advisory Team dealing with the
incorporation of all forces into the SAPS in a private telephone conversation and are based on the figures
from the Police Resource Audits of April 1994.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1996-97
complete the formal incorporation, is expected to be promulgated in
August 1995.
IX. VULNERABILITY OF SA TO SECURITY FORCE TAKE-OVER
Despite the number of coups and attempted coups in the TVBC
states, South Africa has never been close to coups by the military or
police. The simple reason for this, particularly from the 1970s
onwards, is that the security forces have been politicised to the extent
that they were used to enforce apartheid and put down any resistance
to the government, and they did so without any dissent. As mentioned
above, South Africa from 1988 onwards was itself a virtual police
state, and decision-making vested largely with the National Security
Management System. Also, both the SAP and the SADF were heavily
racially biased in favour of whites, and all key positions were held by
conservative whites appointed by the government.
However, developments in the 1990s have not been supported by
these conservative elements and there was some fear that they might
well revolt against the government's initiatives to move the country
towards democracy.
This problem was addressed by then President F.W. De Klerk who
reclaimed civilian control of the state from the security establishment.
The state President's office and the cabinet replaced the state security
council as the seat of state power; the NSMS was replaced by a
national co-ordinating mechanism and the JMCs were replaced by
joint co-ordinating centres. The National Party government also found
it necessary during 1993 and 1994 to purge the leadership of the SAP
and SADF of arch-conservative officers with particularly suspect
human rights records. This lessened the potential for direct takeover.
Many of these officers joined the fascist-leaning AWB, a paramilitary
organisation demanding a homeland for Afrikaners free from black
rule. A number of white police and SADF junior personnel have also
been suspected of membership in this and the other militant Afrikaner
groups. It was feared that they might resist the period of change by
beginning some form of armed struggle.
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Nevertheless, the change to democracy has happened remarkably
peacefully and the AWB and its allies appear to be a spent force.
Although they still have access to weapons and personnel within these
forces, the integration of all armed forces and police into the combined
SAPS and SANDF and the appointment of more representative
leadership has diminished the threat of takeover by right wing
elements.
The new GNU faces enormous challenges in righting the wrongs
of apartheid and providing for those most disadvantaged by apartheid
policies. They have limited resources to perform this massive task,
and there is some concern that people might become impatient for real
and visible change. This could lead to more militant left-wing groups
gaining support and could lead to conflict with the GNU. However,
the prospect of a coup at this time seems rather remote.
X. CONCLUSION
It is never easy describing events in South Africa, particularly
those that relate to or are influenced by apartheid. It is difficult to
follow the breakup of the country into separate homelands; the
banning of political organisations; the armed resistance struggle and
developments since 1990. Much is complicated and hidden that has
yet to be acknowledged.
South Africa is a brand new country, with a brand new democracy,
a brand new Constitution and a brand new government. It is difficult
to assess how successful this transition to democracy has been and
how long the tenuous peace will hold. It is clear that previous
governments have an extremely poor human rights record, and that it
has been the internal security forces who have committed many abuses
in order to perpetuate and protect the entire racist state.
Enemies now find themselves sleeping side-by-side in the police
and armed forces. Whether this sleep will be peaceful or not remains
to be seen. While there is great cause for hope, there is also concern
that the same people who committed human rights violations against
the people of the country are still in service and that all South Africans
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have now to look to them for protection. If ISFs fail to change or if
they are ever again used as political tools, the chance of lasting peace
returning to South Africa will be slim, indeed.
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